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Nunc Dimittis or Chief Cornerstone?: Evaluating 
Africa’s International Norm-Development 
Experiment in the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline 
Project 
Emeka Duruigbo* 
Abstract: Africa extended and strengthened its status as a maker of international 
law by spearheading the creation and implementation of the norm of “shared 
sovereignty” in international criminal adjudication and the  management of pe-
troleum resources through the Special Court for Sierra Leone that was estab-
lished to prosecute the principal actors in a devastating war in West Africa in 
the 1990s and through the Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project that created a 
model for effective production and utilization of natural resources for national 
development. This article argues that by situating itself at the forefront of the 
shared sovereignty experience, Africa is making significant contributions to the 
development of international law and, despite an initial setback, Africa’s effort 
represents a firm foundation upon which major progress can be established. 
This article highlights the key challenges that orchestrated the failure of the 
Chad project, focusing on the inability of international financial institutions 
such as the World Bank Group and state actors to successfully manage complex 
shared sovereignty arrangements, particularly in weak states in unstable re-
gions. The paper further identifies the specific socio-political, economic, struc-
tural, and legal mechanisms that are imperative to ensuring the successful im-
plementation of oil revenue management or natural-resource-based shared 
sovereignty systems in developing nations grappling with sustainable economic 
development and democratization. 
  
 
* Nunc Dimittis is the Latin rendering of the prayer by Simeon in the Gospel of Luke in which he prayed 
that it was time for him to depart the earth since he had witnessed the long-awaited birth and dedication 
of the Savior, Jesus Christ. Luke 2:29 (Authorized Version) (“Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart 
in peace, according to thy word . .”), available at http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/ 
?search=Luke%202&version=AKJV. It has become a song. See also Nsongurua J. Udombana, The In-
stitutional Structure of The African Union: A Legal Analysis, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 69, 72 n.20 and ac-
companying text (2002); H.W. Arthurs, “Mechanical Arts and Merchandise”: Canadian Public Admin-
istration in the New Economy, 42 MCGILL L.J. 29, 40 (1997). The reference to chief cornerstone draws 
from Jesus’ statement, in relation to an Old Testament prophecy, that the rejected stone has become the 
cornerstone upon which a solid structure is built and maintained. Matt. 21:42 (Authorized Version) (“Je-
sus saith unto them, Did ye never read in the scriptures, The stone which the builders rejected, the same 
is become the head of the corner: this is the Lord’s doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes?”), available 
at http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2021&version=AKJV. See also Psalms 
118:22 (Amplified Version) (“The stone which the builders rejected has become the chief corner-
stone.”). 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Africa extended and strengthened its status as a maker of international 
law by spearheading the creation and implementation of the norm of 
“shared sovereignty” in international criminal adjudication and the man-
agement of petroleum resources.1 According to Professor Stephen Krasner 
of Stanford University, a leading proponent of the concept of shared sover-
eignty, the Special Court for Sierra Leone represents a “contemporary ex-
ample of shared sovereignty,” while the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline project is 
a “second and somewhat less clear contemporary case” of shared sovereign-
ty.2 Shared sovereignty occurs when a state allows an external institution to 
address a specific issue within the state’s borders by granting the institution 
powers traditionally reserved to the sovereign.3 Shared sovereignty in this 
sense is an uncommon phenomenon and examples are rare,4 however it is a 
subject that is experiencing a resurgence of interest.5 
African countries are playing a crucial role in this revival through the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone that was established to prosecute the princi-
pal actors in a devastating war in West Africa in the 1990s6 and through the 
 
 1 It is generally assumed that the early development of international law did not involve a great deal 
of African participation. See MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–4 (6th ed. 2012) (outlining 
the history of international law). Cf. James Thuo Gathii, Review of Jeremy Levitt, (Ed.) Mapping New 
Boundaries in African International Law (Albany Law Sch. Research Paper No. 49, 2012) at 1, availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2028999 (“Contributionists, such as T.O. Eli-
as have long argued that Africa participated in the making of international law, contrary to Eurocentric 
accounts that designated Africa as backward, stateless and as such having played no role in the making 
of international law.”). Recently, there has been a rise in academic interest as to the role of non-
European communities in the making of international law. See, e.g., AFRICA: MAPPING NEW 
BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jeremy Levitt ed., 2008) [hereinafter MAPPING NEW 
BOUNDARIES]; Lillian Aponte Miranda, Indigenous Peoples as International Lawmakers, 32 U. PA. J. 
INT’L. L. 203, 236 (2010). 
 2 Stephen D. Krasner, Building Democracy After Conflict: The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 J. 
DEMOCRACY 69, 77–78 (2005) [hereinafter Krasner, Building Democracy]. 
 3 Jürgen Kurtz, Commentary to Professor Stephen D. Krasner, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1103 
(2004) (examining the model of shared sovereignty that permits “the engagement of external actors in 
specific aspects of domestic governance.”). 
 4 Stephen D. Krasner, Troubled Societies, Outlaw States, and Gradations of Sovereignty 31 (Stan-
ford University Department of Political Science, July 2002), available at 
https://bc.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/Krasner_02.05.04.pdf [hereinafter Krasner, Troubled Societies]. 
 5 Different scholarly works have recently discussed this subject. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Ju-
risgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural Principles for Managing Global Legal Pluralism, 20 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 665, 692–93 (2013); Christian Eric Ford & Ben A. Oppenheim, Neotrusteeship 
or Mistrusteeship? The “Authority Creep” Dilemma in United Nations Transitional Administration, 41 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 55, 102–03 (2008); Stefaan Smis & Stephen S. Kingah, The Chad Cameroon 
Pipeline Project (CCPP) and the Dilemmas of the Government of Chad, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
141 (2007). 
 6 The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created under a treaty concluded between the United Na-
tions and the government of Sierra Leone. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Govern-
ment of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
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Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project that created a model for effective pro-
duction and utilization of natural resources for national development. In 
fact, Africa may be appropriately described as the major theater for con-
temporary cases of shared sovereignty. This article argues that by situating 
itself at the forefront of the shared sovereignty experience, Africa is making 
significant contributions to the development of international law and, de-
spite an initial setback, Africa’s effort represents a firm foundation upon 
which major progress can be established. 
This article highlights the key challenges that orchestrated the failure 
of the Chad project, focusing on the inability of international financial insti-
tutions such as the World Bank Group (WBG) and state actors to success-
fully manage complex shared sovereignty arrangements, particularly in 
weak states in unstable regions. The paper also notes that the entrance of 
China and India as serious competitors for Africa’s petroleum has the po-
tential to exacerbate poverty and underdevelopment in the midst of natural 
resource abundance if African governments view the alternative sources of 
investments as a reason to resist significant concessions of their preroga-
tives. Still, Chinese and Indian investment may ameliorate poverty and un-
derdevelopment if the new entrants exercise their leverage to insist on peo-
ple-centered natural resource development. The paper further identifies the 
specific socio-political, economic, structural, and legal mechanisms that are 
imperative to ensuring the successful implementation of oil revenue man-
agement or natural-resource-based shared sovereignty systems in develop-
ing nations grappling with sustainable economic development and democra-
tization. 
This Article is organized into five parts. Part I discusses the concept of 
shared sovereignty and the development and implementation of the norm in 
the Chad–Cameroon pipeline context. Part II grades international law mak-
ing in this example, and concludes that the experiment was a failure. This 
Part explores the reasons for the failure, and notes that the failure is more 
about the form of shared sovereignty adopted—a weak version—than the 
nature of shared sovereignty itself. Part III examines a stronger version of 
shared sovereignty, but views it as incapable of replacing the weak version 
because of theoretical and practical constraints. Part IV proposes a more ef-
fective option that embraces an intermediate version of shared sovereignty. 
While this option does not dispense with the role and relevance of state ac-
tors, it places greater emphasis on the role of corporate actors in promoting 
socio-economic and political development under the umbrella of shared 
sovereignty. Part V addresses potential objections to the proposals made in 
this Article. 
 
U.N.T.S. 38342; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Complex Architecture of International Justice, 10 GONZ. J. 
INT’L L. 38, 39 (2006–2007). 
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 II. NORM DEFINITION, GENERATION, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Several centuries ago the Swiss Jurist Emmerich de Vattel made the 
following observation about sovereignty: “Of all the rights that can belong 
to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious and that which oth-
er nations ought most scrupulously to respect.”7 Among other international 
instruments, the United Nations Charter and the Constitutive Act of the Af-
rican Union provide for and protect the notion of sovereignty.8 Jean Bodin, 
one of the earliest leading authorities on sovereignty and statehood, viewed 
sovereignty as being within the absolute domain of the state, “not limited 
either in power, or in function, or in length of time.”9 Nevertheless, a state 
may, of its own volition, decide that sharing its sovereignty in certain issue 
areas would be an effective way of accomplishing important objectives.10 
Appropriate candidates for this arrangement are weak States or those that 
have demonstrated a history of failure in tackling internal problems. 
 A. Concept of Shared Sovereignty 
According to Professor Krasner, shared sovereignty involves the “en-
gagement of external actors in some of the domestic authority structures of 
the target state for an indefinite period of time.”11 A state applying the con-
cept would engage external actors on an ongoing basis in domestic policy 
making and the management of functions that would ordinarily fall under 
the domain of the government.12 A state may institute a shared sovereignty 
arrangement through a treaty, accord, compact, or some form of contractual 
 
 7 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED 
TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (C. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution, 
1916) (1758). 
 8 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1; Constitutive Act of the African Union, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act. (last visited Feb. 1, 2014); see also Elizabeth E. Ruddick, 
The Continuing Constraint on Sovereignty: International Protection and the Internally Displaced, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 429, 429–30 (1997) (discussing the prominence of sovereignty in the United Nations Char-
ter). 
 9 JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
3 (J.H. Franklin ed. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1992) (1583); Stephen M. Shrewsbury, Sep-
tember 11th and the Single European Sky: Developing Concepts of Airspace Sovereignty, 68 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 115, 117–21 (2003) (discussing the evolution of the sovereignty doctrine). 
 10  Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 70 (“The legitimacy of shared-sovereignty institu-
tions would depend at first on their voluntary negotiation by internationally recognized national political 
authorities. Shared sovereignty is not something to be imposed . .”). 
 11  Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failed States, 29 
INT’L SECURITY 85, 108 (2004) [hereinafter Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty]. 
 12  Emeka Duruigbo, Pioneering Models for International Project Finance and Criminal Adjudica-
tion through Shared Sovereignty, in MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES, supra note 1, at 205 [hereinafter Du-
ruigbo, Pioneering Models]. 
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arrangement between domestic and external actors to take charge of, super-
vise, and control some specific issue areas.13 To make a viable, enduring ar-
rangement, states must ensure that termination can only take place with the 
consent of all the parties or upon the satisfaction of clearly specified condi-
tions.14 The hallmark of an effective shared sovereignty arrangement is self-
enforcement, where foreign and domestic parties have an incentive to ad-
here to the agreement because reneging would be prohibitively expensive.15 
Both distant history and contemporary experience provide valuable 
examples of shared sovereignty in practice. The Ottoman Empire created a 
Council of the Public Debt in the 1870s to forge a pathway for servicing its 
foreign debts and accessing the international capital markets.16 The Council 
comprised representatives from France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Britain, 
Holland, and the Ottoman Empire itself.17 The Council, whose members 
were selected by foreign creditors, derived authority from an Imperial de-
cree, and oversaw revenue from a number of principal taxes such as the salt 
and tobacco monopolies, the stamp tax, and the spirits tax.18 With the con-
sent of the government, the Council could engage in activities aimed at 
promoting overall economic development.19 Its stature and prominence rose 
to the point that it controlled over one-quarter of the Empire’s revenue and 
employed more people than the Finance Ministry.20 
Greece presents another relevant example of shared sovereignty. At 
the end of the 19th century, Greece confronted economic calamity arising 
out of an unsuccessful war with Turkey over Crete. Greece swallowed the 
bitter pill of surrendering a measure of its sovereignty in order to secure 
new funding to service its debts.21 It established an international commis-
sion for fiscal control and incorporated the terms for its establishment in a 
provisional peace treaty between the countries involved.22 Commission 
Members included representatives of major powers, namely Austria-
Hungary, Italy, Germany, France, Russia, and Britain. The Commission su-
perintended significant sources of revenue such as state monopolies on salt, 
petroleum, matches, playing cards and cigarette paper, tobacco duties, and 
the customs revenues of Piraeus. These sources of revenue were essential to 
repaying Greece’s foreign debt and the war indemnity demanded by Tur-
key.23 The Commission also challenged the country’s fiscal independence 
 
 13  Id. 
 14  Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 27. 
 15  Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 70. 
 16  Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 32. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. at 32–33. 
 20  Id. at 33. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
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by limiting what the Greek government could borrow and controlling its 
capital supply.24 
Germany provides a more recent example of shared sovereignty fol-
lowing its defeat in World War II. Germany made commitments under the 
NATO Status-of-Forces Agreements in the 1950s that shared sovereignty 
with the Allied Powers over security matters within German territory.25 The 
Allies had jurisdiction over their own troops who were at liberty to patrol 
public areas including roads, railways and restaurants.26 Commanders of the 
Allied forces were given powers to take any measures deemed necessary for 
maintaining good order and discipline. In addition, the German military 
could fight only after obtaining the approval of both the German and Amer-
ican governments.27 
Africa is contributing significantly to the development of international 
law and relations by pioneering modern shared sovereignty arrangements.28 
Indeed, shared sovereignty arrangements play an important role in the de-
velopment of international law by providing international law and institu-
tions with an additional tool for strengthening state political and administra-
tive capacity. Shared sovereignty presents a clear mechanism that weak 
States (especially those emerging from conflicts or lacking adequate politi-
cal structures) could deploy to build democratic and accountable govern-
mental apparatuses.29 Political theorists contend that natural resources gen-
erate power tussles, or a culture of struggles for the resource rents by 
various segments of the society, which impede the development of democ-
racy in resource-rich societies.30 A workable shared sovereignty model 
should obviate this predicament. 
In addition, a successfully managed shared sovereignty arrangement is 
likely to forestall debilitating internal conflicts and promote peace in the 
country of application. This presents benefits to neighboring countries and 
the international community because the consequences of failed and inade-
 
 24  Id. 
 25  Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 77. 
 26  Id. 
 27  Id. 
 28  See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic 
(Or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 337 (2006). 
 29  Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 70. 
 30  See Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 328 (2001) (exploring 
the role natural resources can play in militating against democracy and noting that “oil and mineral 
wealth tends to make states less democratic.”). But see Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Surviv-
al in the Developing World, 1960-1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SC. 232, 232 (2004) (disputing the conclusion 
that oil wealth is more closely linked with non-viability of regimes and political instability). See gener-
ally Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and People’s Ownership of Natural Resources in Interna-
tional Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33 (2006) [hereinafter Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty] 
(discussing the unhealthy political contestation and corrosive corruption that are engendered by a stri-
dent pursuit of natural resource rents). 
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quate governance often transcend national boundaries. It is a fact of life that 
“[p]oorly governed societies can generate conflicts that spill across interna-
tional borders.”31 Shared sovereignty agreements offer a means to avoid 
these negative externalities. 
Africa is contributing to the development of international law as well, 
in the sense that embarking on shared sovereignty arrangements will con-
tinue historical traditions in international relations. As discussed above, 
states have long relied on some models of shared sovereignty to promote 
peace, foster good relations, and enhance national fortunes. The modern ap-
plication of the concept of shared sovereignty by African countries further 
solidifies the existence of this historical practice and contributes to its pro-
gressive development. Moreover, African countries are placing their mark 
on shared sovereignty by extending the concept to new situations like natu-
ral resource development and management.32 The next section discusses 
shared sovereignty in the Chad–Cameroon context by examining the pur-
pose and design of the project’s Revenue Management Plan (RMP). 
 B. The Chad–Cameroon Pipeline Project 
The multi-billion dollar Chad–Cameroon pipeline project is one of the 
biggest private sector investments in Africa.33 One component of the project 
relates to the extraction of oil from Chad’s Doba Basin. Another component 
focuses on transporting oil produced in Chad via a 670-mile (1,070 km) 
pipeline that passes through Cameroon.34 Commercial project partners es-
tablished an unincorporated joint venture known as the Upstream Consorti-
um to own and finance the exploration component.35 The pipeline compo-
nent has two portions, based in Chad and Cameroon respectively. Tchad Oil 
Transportation Company (TOTCO), an incorporated joint venture between 
the Upstream Consortium and the government of Chad, owns the Chad por-
tion of the pipeline.36 The Cameroon Oil Transportation Company 
(COTCO), a joint venture between the Upstream Consortium and the gov-
ernments of Chad and Cameroon, owns the Cameroon portion of the pipe-
line.37 
The government of Chad entered into a plan with the World Bank, ac-
cepting the involvement of the Bank in managing revenues accruing from 
 
 31  Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty, supra note 11, at 86. 
 32  See generally Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 208. 
 33  See Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse 
in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 39 (2005) [hereinafter, Duruigbo, World Bank]. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
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petroleum development.38 The World Bank’s participation in the project 
was driven by two principal factors. First, Exxon Mobil, the leader of the 
consortium, insisted on the World Bank’s involvement as a condition for its 
proceeding with the investment.39 Second, the World Bank’s belief that it 
could promote its goal of poverty alleviation through the project.40 Accord-
ing to then-President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn, “the project 
provides the best, and perhaps only opportunity for Chad to reduce the se-
vere poverty of most of its population.”41 As a condition for its participa-
tion, the World Bank insisted on a revenue management plan (RMP) that 
would ensure that the proceeds of oil development were used for socio-
economic development, particularly the alleviation of poverty and invest-
ment in the critical sectors of health and education.42 
According to Mr. Wolfensohn, the RMP was intended to act as a coun-
ter to the economic distortion, corruption, and waste that often accompany a 
large influx of oil revenues–a phenomenon known as the “resource curse.”43 
The former Bank President said the Bank was influenced by the experience 
of earlier oil-producing countries that had had difficulty managing natural-
resource booms.44 Accordingly, the Bank decided to collaborate with the 
government of Chad to develop a revenue management program “that tar-
gets oil revenues to key development sectors that are at the heart of its pov-
erty alleviation strategy.”45 
 
 38  Id. 
 39  Exxon Mobil’s insistence was based on the belief that the participation of the World Bank would 
provide the company with the needed cushion from political risk and insulation from critical non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). See Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 216. 
 40  In June 2000 the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank voted to participate in the pro-
ject because of its belief in the project’s commercial viability and capacity to assist with the alleviation 
of poverty in Chad, one of the poorest countries in the world. Id. 
 41  Benjamin C. Esty, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (A), Har-
vard Business School Case Study No. 202-010 (Rev. Mar. 17, 2006), at 6 (citing Letter from James D. 
Wolfensohn to Honorable James P. McGovern, The United States House of Representatives (June 28, 
1999)). 
 42  Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 216. 
 43  See ANDREW INKPEN & MICHAEL H. MOFFETT, THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY: 
MANAGEMENT, STRATEGY & FINANCE 10 (2011) (describing the resource curse as “a paradox of the oil 
and gas industry” in light of the fact that living standards in many oil-producing countries do not match 
their natural resource wealth); RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL 
ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE THESIS (1993); Paul Collier, Laws and Codes for the Resource 
Curse, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 9 (2008); Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institu-
tional Design and Evolution of the Blood Diamond Regime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1723 (2010); 
see also ALAN GELB, OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE? (1988) (noting that inverse relationships 
between oil exploration and subsequent growth and development are ordinary for oil-exporting coun-
tries); see also Esty, supra note 41, at 8. 
 44  Esty, supra note 41, at 8. 
 45  Id.; see also Jacqueline L. Weaver, The Traditional Petroleum-Based Economy: An “Eventful” 
Future, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 505, 555 (2006) (“The Chad project (operated by ExxonMobil) was to show 
the world a new model for petroleum development, one that would assure socio-economic benefits to the 
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The RMP has several core components, notably specifications on the 
allocation and distribution of the expected revenue, a monitoring commit-
tee, an international advisory group, and a special arrangement for the oil-
producing Doba region.46 The government was given almost unfettered dis-
cretion on the expenditure of petroleum tax revenues.47 For direct revenues 
from the project, the government surrendered much of its sovereign discre-
tion and accepted that 10% would be held by the World Bank in a fund for 
future generations. The rest of the revenue from dividends and royalties 
would be deposited in a Special Revenue Account with 80% dedicated to 
the financing of programs in five important sectors: education, rural devel-
opment, infrastructure, social services, and natural resources. Of the re-
maining 20%, the government would keep 15% in its coffers to be spent on 
recurring expenditures outside any oversight, and the remaining 5% would 
be devoted to the development of the oil-producing Doba region.48 
The RMP introduced several layers of oversight. The World Bank and 
the government of Chad approved an annual expenditure, which was then 
reviewed by a nine-member oversight committee—the Petroleum Revenue 
Oversight and Control Committee.49 Committee representatives were drawn 
from the government and civil society (representing local development 
NGOs, trade unions, human rights groups, and religious groups).50 The 
committee members were appointed for terms of three to five years.51 The 
Committee had a mandate to publish an annual review of operations that 
were subject to external audit.52 Some World Bank staff suggested that the 
Committee include foreign membership in addition to the local members, 
“but the Bank’s board vetoed this shared-sovereignty initiative.”53 
The World Bank had considerable power and leverage in monitoring 
the entire program and in reviewing all expenditures. The RMP was a bind-
ing instrument because the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (IBRD) and European Investment Bank (EIB) linked the gov-
ernment’s performance under the RMP to future lending by the World 
Bank.54 The World Bank also created an International Advisory Group 
 
local populations in the villages near the oil fields and pipelines. The huge effort was designed to pre-
vent another Niger Delta.”). 
 46  Duruigbo, World Bank, supra note 33, at 41–43. 
 47  Id. at 41. 
 48  Republic of Chad, Law No. 001/PR/99, Jan. 11, 1999, translated in IAN GARY & NIKKI REISCH, 
CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVS. & BANK INFO. CTR. CHAD’S OIL: MIRACLE OR MIRAGE?: FOLLOWING THE 
MONEY IN AFRICA’S NEWEST PETRO-STATE 98 (2005); Edmund Sanders, Oil Promise Still a Dream, 
L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2006. 
 49  Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 218. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 78. 
 54  Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 218. 
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(IAG), designed to last for ten years and composed of eminent persons.55 
The IAG’s role, however, was merely advisory, and its functions were lim-
ited.56 As a result, critics found additional ground to view the project as 
providing a weak form of shared sovereignty.57 This weak form contrasted 
with a strong version in which there would be substantial sharing of sover-
eignty with a strong external body that could monitor projects and demand 
and effect any needed changes.58 
The World Bank Inspection Panel served as another level of oversight 
for the project.59 The Inspection Panel was created in 1993 by the Board of 
Executive Directors of the Bank to serve as “an independent complaints 
mechanism for people and communities who believe that they have been, or 
are likely to be, adversely affected by a World Bank-funded project.”60 Ac-
cordingly, the Panel afforded groups of citizens an opportunity to present 
their concerns about activities financed by the World Bank that they con-
sidered inimical to their interests.61 The panel’s principal purpose, therefore, 
was to serve as a link between the Board, which is the highest governing 
body of the World Bank, and the people who are likely to be affected by a 
project funded by the Bank.62 In response to a request for inspection, the 
Panel undertook an inspection of the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project and 
issued a report in 2001, in which it called for reinforced monitoring of the 
project by the Bank to guarantee the protection of human rights.63 
In December 1998, the government of Chad passed a law incorporat-
ing the principal elements of the RMP, including auditing procedures and 
 
 55  Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Appoints International Advisory Group on the Chad-
Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (Feb. 21, 2001) available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20014994~menuPK:6428
2137~pagePK:41367~piPK:279616~theSitePK:40941,00.html. See also Genoveva Hernández Uriz, To 
Lend or Not to Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank’s Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 197, 224 (2001). 
 56  Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty and International 
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1095 (2004) [hereinafter Krasner, Shared Sovereignty] (“Nevertheless, 
the level of shared sovereignty is modest. Foreign actors are only fully engaged with the International 
Advisory Group, and it can only give advice.”). 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  See Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the World Bank Standards to the Oil Industry: 
Can the World Bank Group Promote Corporate Responsibility?, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 77, 120 (2002) 
(describing a report issued by the panel). 
 60 The Inspection Panel: About Us, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,menuPK:64129249~pagePK:64132081~piPK:64132052~th
eSitePK:380794,00.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2015); see also Sophie Smyth, NGOs and Legitimacy in 
International Development, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 377, 431 (2012); Daniel D. Bradlow, International Or-
ganizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 
553, 553 (1994). 
 61  See Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 219. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
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provisions relating to the establishment of an oversight committee.64 Chad 
commenced the sale of crude oil in October 2003.65 In November 2003, the 
$6.5 million earned from the first sale of crude oil was deposited into the 
account.66 In December 2003, the government approved its first budget in-
cluding oil revenue and presented it to the RMP for approval.67 
 III. ASSESSMENT OF THE CHAD–CAMEROON SHARED 
SOVEREIGNTY EXPERIMENT 
This Part provides an assessment of the Chad–Cameroon project, and 
also considers the possibility of replicating the experiment elsewhere. The 
World Bank and a number of independent observers understood from the 
outset that the success of this innovative model would assist in finding a 
lasting cure for the resource curse.68 
 A. Failing Grade 
The wisdom of extending shared sovereignty to petroleum develop-
ment is still up for debate. It is clear that its first application in the Chad–
Cameroon Pipeline Project failed in some respects.69 Still, the Chad exper-
iment was a useful initial effort because once its weaknesses are addressed 
it can serve as a valuable blueprint for future projects.70 By extending 
shared sovereignty to natural resource development Africa has made posi-
 
 64  Id. 
 65  Emily Wax, Oil Wealth Trickles Into Chad, but Little Trickles Down Five Months After Opening 
of Pipeline to Cameroon, Locals Await Benefits and Crime Rate Rises, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2004, at 
A16 (reporting on the first few months of oil sales); United Nations, Oil Pipeline Opens for Business, 17 
AFRICA RECOVERY 24 (Oct. 2003) (describing the fiscal aspects of the oil pipeline), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/// 
subjindx/173comm.htm. 
 66  Wax, supra note 65, at A16. 
 67  Id. 
 68  See IAN GARY & TERRY LYNN KARL, BOTTOM OF THE BARREL: AFRICA’S OIL BOOM AND THE 
POOR 60 (2003), available at http://www.ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/AFRICOM/ 
barrel.pdf (“The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project is the most significant, and most closely 
watched experiment designed to change the pattern of the ‘oil curse’ and promote poverty reduction 
through targeted use of oil revenues.”); see also Duruigbo, World Bank, supra note 33, at 32–33 (dis-
cussing the role of the World Bank in combating the resource curse). 
 69  Dustin N. Sharp, Requiem for a Pipedream: Oil, the World Bank, and the Need for Human Rights 
Assessments, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (noting that the World Bank’s efforts in the 
Chad project are viewed as a failure); Scott Pegg, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Collapse of the 
Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 108 AFR. AFF. 311, 311 (2009) (concluding that the international 
community’s experiment in Chad was an “abject failure”). 
 70  Stephen V. Arbogast, Project Financing & Political Risk Mitigation: The Singular Case of the 
Chad-Cameroon Pipeline, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 269, 292 (2008-2009) (“Although many 
NGOs were quick to pronounce the Chad RMP a failure, it would be more accurate to consider it a 
worthwhile first experiment.”). 
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tive contributions to broader international norms concerning shared sover-
eignty. Examining the failure of the Chad project with a view to under-
standing its pitfalls is essential to determining the structural changes that are 
required for a successful model in the future. 
In October 2005, buoyed by rising oil prices, the government of Chad 
announced that it was jettisoning some of its commitments under the ar-
rangement and sought a review of the revenue management law.71 In partic-
ular, under a law signed by Chad’s President in January 2006, the govern-
ment wanted to redefine priority areas to include national security (in 
addition to health and education) so that the government could equip its 
military to contend with rebel uprising in the eastern provinces bordering 
the already violence-prone Darfur region of Sudan.72 The government also 
expressed its intention to abolish the future generations’ fund.73 The World 
Bank was not amused by this change in direction and warned the govern-
ment of Chad that it would consider its reneging on the agreement as a 
breach of the loan agreement.74 
The World Bank followed its threat with action. In January 2006, the 
Bank blocked the government of Chad’s access to royalty payments and 
suspended $124 million dollars in loans.75 In April 2006, the Bank reached 
an interim deal with the Chadian government that obligated the Bank to re-
sume loan disbursements and release more than $100 million in overdue 
royalties to the government, thereby avoiding threatened closure of oil wells 
by the Chadian government if access to the accounts remained blocked.76 
The Bank also agreed to double the percentage of money the government 
could spend without restraint, as requested by the government.77 This aspect 
of the agreement more than doubled the government’s discretionary alloca-
tion, resulting in a sharp reduction of the poverty allocation.78 Instead of 
helping the poor, the government planned to spend the newly unrestricted 
funds on security.79  
 
 71  Lydia Polgreen, Chad Backs Out of Pledge to Use Oil Wealth to Reduce Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2005, at A15. 
 72  Lydia Polgreen, World Bank Reaches Pact with Chad Over Use of Oil Profits, N.Y. TIMES, July 
15, 2006, at A8. 
 73  Paul Blustein, Chad Pipeline Project Steeped in Controversy: World Bank Reconsiders Role as 
Nation Looks at Altering Terms, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 28, 2005. 
 74  Paul Blustein, Chad’s Hard-Line Stance Tests World Bank, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2005. See gen-
erally David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 34–35 (Univ. of Toronto, 
Munk Ctr. for Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. V, 2006). 
 75  David White, World Bank in Deal with Chad Oil Funds, FIN. TIMES EUROPE, Apr. 28, 2006. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Bruce Zagaris, World Bank And Chad Reach Agreement on Use of Oil Profits, 22 INT’L 
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 371 (Sept. 2006) (stating that the new deal allocated 70 percent of the revenues 
to poverty reduction). 
 79  David White, Why a World Bank Oil Project has run into the Sand, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2006), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1/83d76a34-8b76-11da-91a1-0000779e2340.html#axzz3ShLoej84. 
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The Bank and the government of Chad reached a one-year deal in July 
2006 that pertained only to 2007 revenues.80 The deal maintained the in-
crease in discretionary revenues to the government and apportioned 70% of 
all revenues from the project to poverty reduction.81 In a sharp departure 
from the original arrangement under the RMP, the July 2007 agreement in-
cluded indirect revenues, namely taxes and custom duties.82 Thus, it meant 
that the World Bank acquired the authority from the new deal to oversee the 
management of both direct and indirect revenues from petroleum produc-
tion.83 This was significant because the indirect revenues would likely rep-
resent a substantial portion of government revenues in the years ahead.84 
Under the agreement, the government of Chad was also required to under-
take an audit of the special petroleum revenue accounts in 2006 and cooper-
ate with the World Bank and other stakeholders in strengthening the role of 
the Monitoring Committee.85 The Doba region would retain its allocation of 
5% for local projects while revenues in excess of projections would be kept 
in a reserve stabilization fund for use in the future.86 While the agreement 
rejected the government’s redefinition of the priority list to include “securi-
ty”, it nevertheless accepted the government’s addition of “justice” to the 
list.87 The July agreement built on the April interim deal and was designed 
to serve as a basis for a more enduring agreement that would cover reve-
nues in future years.88 
Nevertheless, the relations between the Bank and the government of 
Chad remained frosty. In 2008, the World Bank felt that constraints to con-
tinuation of the arrangement were overwhelming and decided to with-
draw.89 Its confidence strengthened by huge oil revenues, and acting on sig-
nals from the World Bank, Chad paid off its loans to the Bank, terminating 
what was left of the relationship.90 
 
 80  Zagaris, supra note 78, at 371. 
 81  Cathy Landry, Chad Deal to Raise World Bank Influence: New Oil Production Accord Brings 
Clearer Revenue Framework, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, July 17, 2006, at 5. 
 82  Press Release, World Bank, World Bank, Govt of Chad Sign Memorandum of Understanding on 
Poverty Reduction (July 14, 2006), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20994138~menuPK:258658~pagePK:146736~piPK:1468
30~theSitePK:258644,00.html. 
 83  Id. 
 84 See John A. Gould & Matthew Winters, An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Explaining Shifts in 
Leverage Between the Government and the World Bank, 9 BUS. & POL. 1, 2 (2007). 
 85  Landry, supra note 81, at 5. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Annalisa M. Leibold, Aligning Incentives for Development: The World Bank and the Chad-
Cameroon Oil Pipeline, 36 YALE. J. INT’L L. 167, 178 (2011) (stating that on Sept. 9, 2008 the World 
Bank announced that it was withdrawing from the project). 
 90  Id. at 168 (stating that the World Bank required the loan repayment as part of its withdrawal 
terms). 
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 B. Reasons for Failure 
Shared sovereignty arrangements such as the Chad–Cameroon Oil 
Pipeline Project include foundational ingredients that could assure their po-
tential viability.91 They can enhance domestic governance in those develop-
ing countries that are rich in petroleum because the government and an ex-
ternal institution, such as the World Bank, share key powers over the 
revenues.92 Such arrangements could also help in building the basic founda-
tion of a democratic society by establishing a link between the citizen-
beneficiaries and the authority structures, giving citizens both a stake in 
natural resources and an insight into how their government utilizes commu-
nity resources. This sense of ownership exists in developed states through a 
system of “taxation with representation.”93 These arrangements could also 
reduce the corrosive problem of corruption and promote transparency and 
accountability, which can only redound to societal benefit.94 
Unfortunately, these benefits are unlikely to accrue without essential 
ingredients like political will, effective institutional structures, and a strong 
shared sovereignty arrangement. Indeed, the Chad project failed because the 
incursion into the state’s sovereignty was not deep enough to divest the 
government of the power to derail it.95 An incompetent government ran 
most of the show and bungled it. Professor Krasner put it succinctly when 
he viewed the arrangement as a case of shared sovereignty in “watered 
down form.”96 
The Monitoring Committee exemplified the inherent weakness of the 
arrangement. The mandate of the Committee was to “verify,” “authorize,” 
and “oversee” expenditure of revenues, but the precise contours of this 
mandate were hard to identify.97 For instance, it was unclear whether its 
monitoring function was limited to expenditure or extended to encompass 
revenue collection and management.98 The Committee was also viewed as 
 
 91  Jason Schwartz, “Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know”: How Kyoto May Change Who Con-
trols Biodiversity, 14 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 421, 440 n.89 (2006) (noting that “some notion of shared sover-
eignty over natural resources may . be desirable for developing nations to help maximize utility.”). 
 92  Krasner, supra note 4, at 41. 
 93  See Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The Implications Of The Resource 
Curse For Csr Theory And Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 37, 43–45 (2008). 
 94  The effect of transparency on development, however, is open to question. See Alexander Gillies & 
Antoine Heuty, Does Transparency Work? The Challenges of Measurement and Effectiveness in Re-
source-Rich Countries, YALE J. INT’L AFF. 25, 26 (Spring/Summer 2011) (“Despite the widespread sup-
port for transparency and advances made in numerous resource-rich countries, assessments suggest that 
these gains have not triggered major economic or developmental transformations or any significant re-
ductions in corruption.”). 
 95  Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 41 (noting that effectiveness is dependent on the 
sharing of a great deal of sovereignty). 
 96  Id. at 34. 
 97  GARY & KARL, supra note 68, at 67. 
 98  Id. at 70. 
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not sufficiently strong, which would militate against the effective discharge 
of its duties.99 Critics suggested that giving the Monitoring Committee sub-
poena powers would strengthen it and enhance its work.100 The process of 
removing Monitoring Committee members was also easy, leaving enor-
mous room for the government to conveniently remove even competent 
members who fell out of favor with the political authorities.101 A more 
meaningful exercise of shared sovereignty would have shared the powers of 
appointment and removal of Committee members between the government 
and the external institution. One commentator saw this imbalance of power 
and presciently predicted the project’s imminent failure, reasoning that any 
workable scheme would have to provide for the appointment of members of 
the governing or supervisory board by an international organization.102 
The experiment also failed because the government lacked the political 
will to follow through with even the modest commitments that it made.103 
Even at the early stages, critics observed that there was insufficient evi-
dence that the government would follow the RMP’s stipulations.104 They 
pointed to the fact that the Chadian government spent $4.5 million out of its 
$25 million dollar signing bonus on arms purchases.105 The criticism was a 
bit overblown. While it would have been preferable for the government to 
spend resources on the health and education sectors or follow the RMP, 
arms purchases were not prohibited under the governing law nor did that 
law cover how bonuses should be spent. Yet, this early expenditure por-
tended a series of unpalatable moves by the government. 
The civil war in Chad that has been raging for years was also a major 
contributory factor to the project’s failure.106 The government had strong 
legitimate interests in directing available funds to repelling rebel move-
 
 99  Luc Lampriere et al., Managing Oil Revenues in Chad: Legal Deficiencies and Institutional 
Weaknesses (Oct. 13, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard Law School Human Rights 
Clinical Program). 
 100  Id. 
 101  See GARY & KARL, supra note 68, at 72. 
 102  James C. Owens, Government Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa: The International Community’s 
Options, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1047–49 (2003). 
 103  Lampriere et al., supra note 99, at 2, 5 (stating that the success of the program would depend on 
political will). 
 104  GARY & KARL, supra note 68, at 67, 69 (“But as good as the revenue management law sounds on 
paper, there are very significant weaknesses in the design and practical application of the law. This was 
made painfully clear in late 2000 when the government announced that it had spent the first $4.5 million 
of a $25 million signing bonus paid for by the oil consortium on military weapons rather than on any 
priority sectors.”). 
 105  Id. The Chadian government’s action embarrassed the World Bank; see Dana L Clark, The World 
Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 205, 210 n.17 
(2002). 
 106  Lydia Polgreen, World Bank Reaches Pact with Chad Over Use of Oil Profits, N.Y. TIMES, July 
15, 2006, at A8. 
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ments and restoring at least a modicum of political stability.107 Finally, 
some commentators also linked the failure of the experiment to the obso-
lescing bargaining conundrum.108 Matthew Winters and John Gould de-
scribed the obsolescing bargain theory and its effect on the World Bank’s 
efforts in Chad as follows: 
Unlike other forms of capital, wealth that is in the ground cannot flee 
the grabbing hand of the state. However, extraction infrastructure requires 
heavy initial investment, and this in turn gives investors some leverage over 
the government at the point of entry. In Chad, the World Bank used this 
leverage to create specific policies and institutions. Yet this leverage is 
temporary. It erodes once the initial fixed capital investments are made. 
“Obsolescing bargain theory” predicts that foreign actors have the greatest 
leverage over a host country at the moment just before they begin to invest 
in the infrastructure necessary for extraction. As investment capital morphs 
into immobile infrastructure and, as domestic partners develop greater ex-
pertise and operational capacity, foreign-financed infrastructural invest-
ments can become hostages in host-country efforts to obtain an improved 
share of the final revenues. Bargaining power therefore shifts to the host 
country.109 
Although this shared-sovereignty experiment was unsuccessful, it 
should not sound the death knell for future collaboration by international 
organizations, energy companies, and weak states to develop natural re-
sources in a way that brings development to the country.110 The prospects of 
shared sovereignty in petroleum development depend on how well the norm 
is designed to achieve the main objectives. One option is to introduce a 
strong version of shared sovereignty that is at the opposite end of the spec-
trum from the version employed in Chad. 
 
 107  Id. 
 108  Pegg, supra note 69, at 313; John A. Gould and Matthew S. Winters, An Obsolescing Bargain in 
Chad: Shifts in Leverage Between the Government and the World Bank, 9 BUS. & POL. 1, 18 (2007) 
(“As obsolescing bargaining theory predicts, the Consortium and the World Bank had invested their re-
sources in the country, providing infrastructure and expertise, and now, with those costs sunk, Chad had 
a hostage to deploy in its efforts to redefine the bargain.”). 
 109  Matthew S. Winters & John A. Gould, Betting on Oil: The World Bank’s Attempt to Promote 
Accountability in Chad, 17 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 229, 233 (2011) (citation omitted). See also Michele 
Ruta & Anthony J. Venables, International Trade in Natural Resources: Practice And Policy 25-26 
(World Trade Org., Econ. Research and Statistics Div., Staff Working Paper ERSD-2012-07, March 
2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201207_e.pdf (“In order to bid for a 
licence, investors have to formulate a view about the long run return to the project. This is particularly 
true since capital expenditure will be sunk; unlike other forms of FDI, a mine or oil well cannot be dis-
mantled and moved to another location in the event of the project failing . . The combination of sunk 
costs and high and potentially variable tax rates creates a severe hold-up problem.”). 
 110  Leibold, supra note 89, at 169–70 (“reiterating the importance of the Bank’s potential role as an 
intermediary in resource exploitation projects in nondemocratic and underdeveloped countries in the 
continuing quest to solve the resource curse.”). 
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 IV. THE STRONG VERSION OF SHARED SOVEREIGNTY 
Even before the failure of the Chad experiment, Professor Krasner was 
skeptical of its success, especially because it represented a weak version of 
shared sovereignty. In a series of articles, Krasner called for a strong ver-
sion of shared sovereignty that encroached further into areas traditionally 
reserved to the state by allowing an international body to play a more robust 
role in domestic governance. The features of this version are discussed in 
greater detail below. 
 A. Features of the Strong Version 
The strong version of shared sovereignty is built around the creation of 
an institution, such as a trust, under an agreement made by a national gov-
ernment and an international organization.111 The trust will be domiciled in 
a foreign country where respect for the rule of law is paramount.112 The re-
source revenues will be kept in an international escrow account controlled 
by the trust.113 The government will appoint half of the trustees, while the 
international organization will appoint the other half.114 All disbursements 
from the account must be authorized by a majority of the trustees.115 The 
trust agreement will stipulate broad areas of spending, but will also allow 
the government a choice of specific allocations.116 The trust will not dis-
pense funds for non-conforming spending.117 The trust may be empowered 
to withdraw funds from the escrow account to implement programs if gov-
ernment delays or fails to act.118 The trustees will be subject to the laws of 
the advanced democracy where the trust is domiciled.119 The arrangement 
will also incorporate extra-territorial responsibility of home country of the 
participating multinational corporations to pass laws mandating the firms to 
pay revenues only into the escrow account.120 The country in which the trust 
is domiciled will also pass similar legislation.121 
 B. Weaknesses of the Strong Version 
The primary problem with this option is how difficult it is to sell in a 
 
 111  See Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 41. 
 112  See Krasner, Shared Sovereignty, supra note 56, at 1097. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 1098. 
 121  Id. 
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negotiation. It is quite unlikely that any government would accept the level 
of encroachment into its internal affairs that the above arrangement in-
vites.122 The suggested extraterritorial legislation may also be a tough sell to 
home countries of the foreign enterprises,123 especially if it will place cor-
porations headquartered in their jurisdictions at a competitive disadvantage 
vis-à-vis companies from countries without similar legislation.124 We may 
also witness an increase in “paper re-incorporations” in jurisdictions that 
have no link to the corporations but are instead selected because they would 
not enforce such strict rules.125 In essence, the familiar concept of flag of 
convenience that has been used for a long time in international shipping and 
trade would be applied to foreign investment.126 
This challenge is further compounded by the entry of China and India 
into what has been described as a new “scramble” for Africa’s natural re-
sources.127 With these countries eager to meet a significant portion of their 
energy needs with oil and gas deposits in Africa,128 despots would be able 
 
 122  Stefaan Smis & Stephen S. Kingah, How the Government of Chad Can Meet Development 
Pledges to its People Without Breaching its Obligations with the World Bank and Multinational Oil 
Companies, 4 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 39 (2007); Krasner, Shared Sovereignty, supra note 56, 
at 1095. 
 123  See Edwin Mujih, The Regulation of Multinational Companies Operating in Developing Coun-
tries: A Case Study of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 16 RADIC 83, 97 (2008) (stating that the 
home countries of multinationals may be unwilling or unable to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to 
regulate corporate activities to ensure that such corporations act in a socially responsible manner). 
 124  Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmenta-
tion, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 288 (1999) (discussing the competitive disadvantage that American com-
panies confront with regard to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Russell J. Weintraub, International 
Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321, 352 (1994) (advancing the argument that 
by entertaining suits by foreigners who were injured abroad, U.S. courts were placing American compa-
nies at a competitive disadvantage worldwide). 
 125  R. Tali Epstein, Should the Fair Labor Standards Act Enjoy Extraterritorial Application? A Look 
at the Unique Case of Flags of Convenience, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 653, 663 (1993) (discussing mo-
tivation for registering or re-registering ships in certain countries and noting that the primary motivation 
is financial). See generally TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Olivier de Schutter 
ed., 2006) (discussing the problem in connection with human rights legislation). 
 126  See generally Eric Powell, Taming The Beast: How the International Legal Regime Creates and 
Contains Flags of Convenience, 19 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 263 (2013); EMEKA DURUIGBO, 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLIANCE 
ISSUES IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (2003) (discussing flags of convenience shipping). This concern 
may be overblown in this instance—as opposed to extraterritorial human rights legislation—because in 
the case of shared sovereignty, the oil companies are assumed to be willing participants, and should have 
no problem complying with this particular condition if home and host governments agree to it. 
 127  Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, The Second Scramble for Africa’s Oil and Mineral Resources: Bless-
ing or Curse?, 42 INT’L LAW 193, 193 (2008); Sharp, supra note 69, at 385 (noting Chinese and Indian 
interest in African oil and gas). 
 128  Richard J. Stoll, Is Chinese Foreign Policy Targeting Sub-Saharan Africa?, in THE RISE OF 
CHINA AND ITS ENERGY IMPLICATIONS 9 (James A. Baker Institute, Rice University, Dec. 2, 2011), 
available at http://bakerinstitute.org/files/531/ (“Many observers feel that to feed its need for energy, 
China has particularly targeted Sub-Saharan Africa.” (citation omitted)). 
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to evade what would have been a major bargaining lever for extracting con-
cessions from them—the non-availability of capital investment.129 Indeed, 
oil and gas resources have enjoyed this advantage over the years, serving as 
attractive collateral to lenders and other investors that would otherwise be 
reluctant.130 The World Bank acknowledged as much in its final assessment 
of the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project: “With the rapid increase in oil 
price after 2000, it is almost certain that the oil would have been developed 
and the pipeline constructed even without WBG involvement, albeit one or 
two years later.”131 
Apart from the practical constraint that virtually no government would 
find the proposal for strong version of shared sovereignty attractive, there is 
also the theoretical or conceptual challenge that the proposal is a guise for 
imperialism or colonialism.132 This is a charge that is leveled at shared sov-
ereignty generally, including the weak version deployed in Chad.133 Never-
theless, the complaint becomes more persuasive as the sharing of sovereign-
ty deepens. Proponents of the strong version would of course reject and 
refute the charge of imperialism. As a matter of fact, Professor Krasner sees 
shared sovereignty as quite attractive because it does not fit those unpalata-
ble labels.134 Krasner notes that shared sovereignty arrangements are not 
tarred by the “delegitimating accusations of colonialism”135 that trailed oth-
er instruments like the Mandate System under the League of Nations or the 
Trusteeship System under the United Nations.136 For instance, there is no 
 
 129  See Leibold, supra note 89, at 177 (stating that Chad’s President Deby threatened to turn over the 
project to Chinese interests if Exxon did not meet his demands to pay millions of dollars in royalties, 
bypassing the escrow account established under the Revenue Management Law). China has an interest 
in Sudanese oil, depending on Sudan for a decent percentage of its oil imports. This is believed to have 
exacerbated the dangerous, precarious situation in that country. See Elise Aiken, Energy Justice: Achiev-
ing Stability in Oil-Producing African Nations, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 293, 303 (2011); 
Okeke, supra note 127, at 198. 
 130  See ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 713 (3d ed., 2010) 
(noting that “oil-exporting nations pledged their petroleum resources as collateral and became saddled 
with huge debts to international institutions when oil prices later fell.”); Jedrzej George Frynas & Ma-
nuel Paulo, A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political, and Business Perspectives, 106 AFR. 
AFF. 229, 240 (2007); GARY & KARL, supra note 68, at 33 (discussing oil-backed loans by Angola and 
its potential economic implications). 
 131  INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., REPORT NO. 50315: THE WORLD BANK GROUP PROGRAM OF SUPPORT 
FOR THE CHAD CAMEROON PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION 43 (Nov. 20, 
2009) [hereinafter WORLD BANK ASSESSMENT]. 
 132  See Stephen Ellis, West Africa and Its Oil, 102 AFR. AFF. 135, 137 (2003). 
 133  See Smis & Kingah, supra note 122, at 31. 
 134  Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 31. 
 135  Id. 
 136  For extensive and penetrating discussions of the “Mandate” and “Trusteeship” systems see gen-
erally Antony Anghie, Nationalism, Development and the Postcolonial State: The Legacies of the 
League of Nations, 41 TEX. INT’L L. J. 447 (2006); Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of Inter-
national Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513 (2002); Antony Anghie, “The Heart of My Home”: Colonialism, Envi-
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foreign colonial power involved in the arrangement nor does any foreign 
country station its nationals in the “colonized country” to direct its political 
and economic affairs. 
Shared sovereignty also appears more attractive than modern proposals 
for neo-trusteeships for failed States and contested territories,137 which 
many developed and developing states will reject as a direct assault on their 
sovereignty.138 Working out the details of such trusteeships may also prove 
difficult.139 Moreover, supporters of shared sovereignty arrangements argue 
that states like Chad do not represent the will of the people, so their gov-
ernments’ claims of sovereignty, let alone popular sovereignty, should be 
discounted.140 Additionally, where the citizens of the country favor such in-
tervention, government officials should not be encouraged to use sovereign-
ty as a subterfuge to continue subjugating their people to unpopular practic-
es.141 Indeed, there is evidence from early conceptions of sovereignty that it 
was instituted as a tool to help the people, and not as a cloak to perpetrate 
and perpetuate poor governance.142 
 V. AN INTERMEDIATE VERSION OF SHARED SOVEREIGNTY 
The weaknesses of both the strong and weak versions of shared sover-
eignty leave room for exploring an intermediate option. The intermediate 
option envisaged here will strengthen the responsibilities of the World 
Bank, national government, and private oil companies while increasing op-
portunities for citizens in oil-producing communities.143 Its three compo-
 
ronmental Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L L. J. 445 (1993). 
 137  For various proposals on forms of modern trusteeship see generally RICHARD CAPLAN, A NEW 
TRUSTEESHIP? THE INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF WAR-TORN TERRITORIES (2002); James D. 
Fearon and David D. Laitlin, Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5 
(2004); Martin Indyk, A Trusteeship for Palestine, 82 FOREIGN. AFF. 51 (May/June 2003); Gerald B 
Helman and Steven R Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN. POL’Y 3 (Winter 1993). 
 138  Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 24–25. 
 139  Id. at 23. 
 140  Leibold, supra note 89, at 199. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Mortimer Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law, 11 CONN. J. INT’L L. 403, 410 
(1996). 
 143  Peter Rosenblum has made the following observation regarding the Chad–Cameroon project: 
At the core is a challenge to the sovereignty of undemocratic rulers . . . . Previously, no one 
would have interfered in the relations between an oil company and an African state. He who 
ruled the state controlled its resources . . . . There is still hope of a delicate balance, where the 
World Bank strengthens loan conditions that reinforce the democratic process in Chad and 
enable the Chadian people to better determine how their resources should be spent. That 
would still threaten the sovereignty of leaders, but would also empower the people. 
Peter Rosenblum, Pipeline Politics in Chad, 99 CURRENT HIST. 195, 195–99 (2000). This observation 
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nents of stronger sovereign-international actor commitment, corporate im-
mersion, and community participation are discussed below. 
 A. Stronger Sovereign-International Actor Commitment 
While a strong version of shared sovereignty does not seem feasible, it 
is also not possible to continue with the weak version and expect remarka-
ble development outcomes. Accordingly, an effective arrangement requires 
some level of tightening to avoid the loopholes that bedeviled the Chad ar-
rangement with the World Bank. The following suggestion is on point: 
For starters, the next RMP should give the Bank more enforcement 
controls over the portion of the host country’s project cash flows 
dedicated to development. This is an area that warrants careful legal 
study. In the 2006 showdown Chad was able to access enough funds 
to avoid a financial crisis while it waited out its conflicts with the 
Bank. . . . In the future, with careful legal crafting, the Bank and the 
host government may agree to characterize the use of offshore es-
crow accounts as a “commercial matter,” the handling of which gov-
ernments can agree to via contract. This may prevent the host gov-
ernment from later asserting its sovereign powers to force funds 
repatriation and, at a minimum channel any dispute to an internation-
al dispute resolution forum. If the government knows it cannot 
quickly force a repatriation of offshore funds, its incentives to breach 
a contract are greatly reduced. Similarly, if a host government knows 
it does not have the funding to withstand a long dispute, the likeli-
hood of the government attempting to override contract terms dimin-
ishes.144 
Building and strengthening domestic institutions before the revenue 
from oil starts flowing should also be an important component of this ar-
rangement.145 One country that has clearly escaped the resource curse is 
Norway, and its success has been attributed to the fact that it had strong in-
stitutions capable of withstanding the influx of oil revenues prior to the 
windfall.146 Scholars believe that massive oil revenues weaken existing in-
stitutions or impede their emergence.147 An effective state should have insti-
 
can be interpreted as favoring an intermediate version of shared sovereignty. 
 144  Arbogast, supra note 70, at 294. 
 145  See id. at 295; see also Leibold, supra note 89, at 198 (“[T]he Bank should have used its initial 
leverage in the project to expand its control over the oil revenue until Chad’s political institutions ma-
tured enough to absorb oil revenue without undue risk of falling into a rentier economy. These policies 
would have the cumulative effect of promoting institutional and democratic growth within Chad. This 
growth would have created a crucial counterweight to the perverse political incentives created by oil 
revenue.”). 
 146  TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES 216 (1997). 
 147  Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of Unconditioned Wealth, 27 
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tutions for collecting and distributing tax revenues from the citizens, which 
would also gather valuable personal information for meaningful national 
planning.148 
 B. Corporate Immersion 
One salient advantage of China’s strong interest in African energy is 
the possibility of entrenching the approach of attaching oil and gas licensing 
to corresponding investment in domestic infrastructure.149 This investment 
could take the form of railroads, airports, refineries, educational institutions, 
or health facilities. This feature should be required in every shared sover-
eignty arrangement. Where there are extenuating circumstances, such as po-
litical optics or inadequate personnel, that justify abandoning direct corpo-
rate involvement, private companies can still make their impact felt through 
 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 84, 105 (2009) (“According to a political economic approach, there is increasing 
evidence that resource wealth can contribute to a weakening of democratic institutions, an increase in 
official corruption, and a deterioration in human rights practices.”). See generally Nathan Jensen & 
Leonard Wantchekon, Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa, 37 COMP. POL. STUD. 816 
(2004); Leonard Wantchekon, Why do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian Govern-
ments?, 5 J. AFR. FIN. & ECON. DEV. 57 (2002). But see Patrick Wieland, Going Beyond Panaceas: Es-
caping Mining Conflicts in Resource-Rich Countries Through Middle-Ground Policies, 20 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 199, 222–23 (2013) (“Recently the resource curse literature has been subject to criticism. 
While it is true that possession of oil, natural gas, and minerals does not necessarily confer economic 
success, it does not follow that natural wealth must lead to inferior economic or political development. 
The resource curse is not a categorical rule that resource-rich countries are doomed to failure. Natural 
endowment should be viewed as a double-edged sword with both benefits and dangers, leading to suc-
cess in some cases and failure in others.” (citations omitted)); see also Stephen Haber & Victor 
Menaldo, Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse, 105 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2011) (stating that fiscal dependence on oil, gas, and minerals does not necessarily 
lead to authoritarian political regimes in the long run). 
 148  Terry Lynn Karl, Ensuring Fairness: The Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract, in 
ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 256, 278 (Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Joseph E. Stigltiz 
eds., 2007). 
 149  See Alexis Habiyaremye, CHINAFRIQUE, AFRICOM, and African Natural Resources: A Mod-
ern Scramble for Africa?, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIP. & INT. REL. 79, 89 (2011) (“The Chinese strategy of 
swapping large infrastructure projects for access to mineral resources also created a completely new 
feature in the resource market. By building much needed infrastructure in Africa, China has the ad-
vantage of acquiring African resources in exchange for undertaking development projects on African 
soil instead of sending oil revenues to foreign bank accounts. For example, in exchange for Angolan oil, 
China agreed to finance huge infrastructure projects that include the building of 215,000 housing units, 
restoring 1,000 miles of highway and 1,665 miles of railroad, plus the construction of a new internation-
al airport in the capital city of Luanda. Reconstruction in war-battered Angola was accelerated by three 
oil-backed loans from Beijing, under which Chinese companies have built roads, railways, hospitals, 
schools, and water systems. Nigeria took out similar loans to finance projects that use gas to generate 
electricity. In May 2006, the China State Construction Engineering Company signed an agreement with 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to invest $23 billion toward the building of oil refineries 
and a petrochemical plant in Nigeria. Chinese teams are also building a hydropower project in the Re-
public of Congo, to be repaid in oil, and another in Ghana, to be repaid in cocoa beans.”). 
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indirect participation in development projects. They can make their staff 
available to government agencies and non-governmental organizations exe-
cuting meaningful projects in local areas.150 This part of the arrangement 
may be bolstered by the World Bank’s leverage through its Multilateral In-
vestment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) that insures investment of private cor-
porations in risky political environments.151 The Bank could condition such 
political-risk insurance on acceptance of this immersion mandate by multi-
national corporations that enjoy MIGA’s investment protection.152 Besides, 
the Chad project has demonstrated that the involvement of the World Bank 
could be very beneficial to the energy companies, not only by providing le-
gitimacy but also by providing insulation that enhances profit-realization.153 
Exxon and other oil companies essentially conditioned their investment on 
the involvement of the World Bank, realizing the importance of such col-
laboration in staving off criticisms from civil society groups and providing 
 
 150  See Arbogast, supra note 70, at 295 (“It is understandable that private companies don’t want to 
take on responsibilities more properly within the purview of the government and the Bank. However, 
there are ways to help the RMP succeed without taking over responsibility for its target projects. Com-
panies like Exxon are experienced in “lending” technical staff to joint ventures. Occasionally they even 
lend staff to government or non-profit organizations. Such staff makes major contributions to imple-
menting joint projects. This occurs without the private company taking over responsibility for the ven-
ture. A willingness to lend a hand in this fashion could give timely reinforcement to the host country’s 
development efforts; this in turn may contribute to a functional RMP that secures stable relations with 
the host government and the native population.”). 
 151  MIGA was created by the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agen-
cy, opened for signature October 11, 1985, and entered into force April 12, 1988. See Convention Estab-
lishing the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA), Apr. 12, 1988, 24 I.L.M. 1598, available 
at www.miga.org/documents/ 
miga_convention_november_2010.pdf.; see also Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Im-
proving the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 103, 105 & n.9, 126 (1992). 
 152  For additional discussion of MIGA, including history, scope of activities, and modus operandi 
see Overview, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/whoweare/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2015); Sergio 
Puig, Emergence & Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration & In-
ternational Investment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 531, 560 (2013) (“MIGA was conceived as a financially 
‘sufficient’ institution providing risk insurance against losses caused by non-commercial risks such as 
expropriation, war and civil disturbance to complement the private sector arms of the [World Bank 
Group] to incentivize long-term commitment of resources. MIGA offers coverage and prices its guaran-
tee premiums based on a calculation of both country and project risk.” (citation omitted)); see also Val-
entina Okaru-Bisant, Overcoming Challenges in The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s Risk 
Insurance Coverage to Private Water Investors: Corruption and Consumer Risks, 57 S.D. L. REV. 277, 
280 (2012); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The Role of 
the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 97, 108 (1986) 
(“MIGA’s objective will be to encourage the flow of investments for productive purposes among its 
member countries, and in particular to developing member countries. To fulfill its objective, MIGA will 
guarantee and reinsure eligible investments against losses resulting from non-commercial risk. Such 
insurance activities, however, only represent one means of achieving MIGA’s objective, and the Agency 
will carry out a broad range of promotional activities as well.” (citation omitted)). 
 153  See Arbogast, supra note 70, at 290–92. 
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protection from political risks.154 
Corporate immersion may even go beyond participation in develop-
ment projects to involvement in environmental cleanup and voluntary re-
duction of natural gas flaring.155 In the Chad project, oil companies were 
able to contractually shift virtually every responsibility for environmental 
damage to the government of Chad.156 Considering that many developing 
countries lack the technical expertise, financial resources, and political dis-
position to handle environmental matters, this is an unfortunate shift that 
almost assures abdication and neglect.157 Host communities are doubly af-
fected; not only from an environmental perspective but also from an eco-
nomic standpoint because their economy may be built around fishing, farm-
ing, and other activities that are virtually incompatible with polluted rivers 
and contaminated soil.158 
Policy makers should start giving thought to a form of compulsory in-
surance policy that is undertaken and maintained by companies engaged in 
oil exploration and production that addresses liability claims by affected 
persons and communities.159 A program of that nature exists for oil and 
shipping companies engaged in the transportation of petroleum across the 
world. Under the Community Risk Insurance Program (CRIP) envisaged 
here, cleanup responsibilities and compensation for property damage would 
be financed out of the policy and paid by the insurance company like any 
other form of insurance.160 The advantages include promptness in settling 
 
 154  See Scott Pegg, Can Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse? Evidence from the Chad-
Cameroon Pipeline Project, 105 AFR. AFF. 1, 8 (2005). 
 155  Ashley Palomaki, Flames Away: Why Corporate Social Responsibility is Necessary to Stop Ex-
cess Natural Gas Flaring in Nigeria, 24 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 524–
27 (2013) (arguing that multinational corporations should embark on voluntary initiatives that minimize 
harmful flaring of natural gas in places where regulatory oversight is weak or non-existent, in view of 
the negative economic and environmental consequences). 
 156  Edwin Mujih, The Regulation of Multinational Companies Operating in Developing Countries: A 
Case Study of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 16 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 83 (2008). 
 157  Emeka Duruigbo, Multinational Corporations and Compliance with International Regulations 
Relating to the Petroleum Industry, 7 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 101, 139 (2001) (discussing the 
low level of environmental expertise in many developing countries). 
 158  Lisa Stevens, The Illusion of Sustainable Development: How Nigeria’s Environmental Laws Are 
Failing the Niger Delta, 36 VT. L. REV. 387, 392–93 (2011) (discussing the negative effects of oil spills 
and gas flaring on agriculture). 
 159  See Muhammad Masum Billah, The Role of Insurance in Providing Adequate Compensation and 
in Reducing Pollution Incidents: The Case of the International Oil Pollution Liability Regime, 29 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 42, 57 (2011) (“The object of ensuring adequate compensation to oil pollution victims is 
further strengthened by the provision of direct action against the insurer of a liable ship-owner. This is a 
major departure from traditional insurance policy under which a third party may not bring an action 
against the insurer because insurance is a contract between the insurer and the insured ship-owner. 
Therefore, there is no privity of contract between the insurer and a third party victim. This is especially 
the case in indemnity insurance as opposed to mere liability insurance.” (citation omitted)). 
 160  See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Catastrophic Oil Spills and the Problem of Insurance, 64 
VAND. L. REV. 1769 (2011). 
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claims, internalization of externalities by those generating the harm, and 
consequently the prevention of such harm from occurring or recurring.161 
Another advantage is that insurance companies will serve as monitors 
of corporate operations, pushing oil companies toward proper environmen-
tal behavior since the insurance companies are interested in minimizing the 
payouts they make under any insurance policy.162 As commercial monitors, 
they can be catalysts of desired change. Insurance companies will have an 
incentive to act as effective monitors because their actions have financial 
implications for their shareholders as well as themselves.163 This monitoring 
role is likely to assume greater effectiveness when the insurance program is 
coupled with a direct-action component that enables third parties to bring 
actions directly against insurance companies under the policy.164 
 
 161  For a helpful discussion of externalities see RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
90 (8th ed. 2011) (defining externalities as costs or benefits that are external to an actor’s decision-
making process); JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
25 (4th ed. 2014) (stating that “[o]ne of the key goals of environmental law is . to bring environmental 
externalities into the marketplace.”); Russel Lawrence Barsh, Coast Salish Property Law: An Alternative 
Paradigm for Environmental Relationships, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1375, 1376 
(2008) (stating that “[t]he classic example of an externality has been the impact on the quality of the 
environment”); see generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 162  Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Profes-
sional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1415 (2013) (“Once insurers accept the financial responsibility 
for civil liability, they not only have an incentive to manage the defense and settlement of liability 
claims, but they also have an incentive to reduce the likelihood that those claims arise in the first place. 
This should make sense. Just as the fear of liability is supposed to incentivize potential wrongdoers to 
take appropriate precautions, fear of liability should incentivize an insurer to encourage its insured to 
take precautions. Once an insurer underwrites a risk, the insurer has every reason to try to reduce its 
payouts by encouraging insureds to prevent the potential loss from materializing.” (citation omitted)). 
The idea here is that when people have skin in the game, it tends to affect their behavior. See The Moni-
tor, Bank Regulation, 32:10 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 20, 20 (Oct. 2013) (noting that in 
the bank regulatory context, having skin in the game aligns the economic interest of sponsors of securit-
ization transactions with those of investors in asset-backed securities, with the potential effect that secu-
ritizers would be more careful about the securities they helped place in the market, as they also stand to 
lose their own investment if things go wrong). 
 163  This is in contrast to non-commercial monitors. While the latter category of monitors may still be 
effective in carrying out their responsibilities, the fact that the outcome of their task does not involve a 
direct financial cost or impact on their bottom line could be a disadvantage vis-à-vis commercial moni-
tors. Besides, business groups tend to favor those non-commercial monitors that are not truly independ-
ent unless an independent monitor is imposed on them. See, e.g., F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant 
& Veronica S. Root, Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 
13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321 (2011) (discussing the use of independent monitors under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act as a means of ensuring corporate compliance with the stipulations of the law). 
 164  See Billah, supra note 159, at 74–75. 
[D]irect action against insurers makes the probability of actual liability even higher than 
would be the case without the provision of direct action even when insurance is compulsory. 
There are two explanations for this: first, despite compulsory insurance, an insured may be 
bankrupt and the insurer could simultaneously deny the liability judgment on grounds of lack 
of privity of contract between the insurer and the liability claimant; second, the insurer may 
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Insurance could also have a cascading effect that goes beyond influ-
encing the behavior of one set of actors. Insurance arrangements not only 
affect the behavior of insurance companies and the insured persons paying 
the premiums; the resulting change in action could spill over to those who 
are only indirectly involved in terms of financial responsibility, but who 
still generate harms. This chain of actions and reactions would lead to better 
outcomes for potential victims. For instance, in the oil shipping area, where 
some of the compensation funds are funded by the oil industry and not by 
ship owners, oil companies have sought ways to protect their own interests 
by improving the behavior of the shipping companies.165 One scholar de-
scribes the change: 
[E]ven though the second and third tier of insurance through the 
[Compensation Funds] are mainly designed for adequate compensa-
tion and are funded by the oil industry and not by ship-owners, these 
arrangements indirectly put pressure on ship-owners to be more dili-
gent in the operation of their ships. This is because oil companies, 
who are the main contributors to both funds, are also the main, if not 
sole, customers of the oil-carrying ships (tankers). Given that the op-
eration of these ships has a direct effect on the ultimate contributions 
that oil companies make to the Funds, oil companies as a group are 
naturally opposed to and united against substandard shipping. This 
opposition translates into various initiatives to motivate ship-owners 
toward optimal care. One such initiative is a database maintained by 
the oil industry on substandard ships, known as the Ship Inspection 
Report (SIRE) Program. The database contains inspection reports on 
 
plead some policy defenses or exceptions (e.g., non-payment of premium) against the insured 
and consequently against the claimant. The provisions of direct action against insurers under 
the oil pollution liability regime eliminated both these possibilities. 
  As insurers will be exposed to more frequent payouts to the victims of oil pollution in cases 
of negligence by the insured ship-owner, insurers will charge higher premiums on negligent 
ship-owners. Increased premiums will in turn induce the insured to reduce their insurer’s ex-
posure to oil pollution claims. The only way the insured can do this is through improving 
their standard of care so that the number of oil pollution incidents decreases from the existing 
level. The dramatic reduction in oil pollution accidents may be at least partly due to this indi-
rect incentive towards care, emanating from the provision of direct action in the oil pollution 
liability regime. 
The direct action provision also motivates insurers to be extra vigilant against the negligent 
conducts of their insured ship-owners. Insurers have various tools such as premium rate vari-
ance, deductibles, policy limit, and even outright denial of coverage to check the carelessness 
of insured ship-owners. Since insurers use these tools even when there is no provision for di-
rect action against them, they now have an added incentive to use them more frequently. The 
end result is increased pressure on the owners of substandard ships to take optimal care. 
Id. (citation omitted ). 
 165  See Billah, supra note 159, at 75–76. 
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many oil-carrying ships.166 
In the case of human rights and environmental abuse, a regime of 
compulsory insurance could galvanize insurers and the insured to seek be-
havior modification among government security agents and public policy 
makers that leads to the introduction and implementation of the right poli-
cies and initiatives that are environmentally rewarding and human rights 
enhancing. In sum, insurance represents a market-based solution that has 
the potential to alter corporate behavior while avoiding regulatory intru-
siveness for the corporations and bureaucratic bottlenecks for the communi-
ties.167 The third component of the intermediate form of shared sovereignty 
is community participation, discussed below. 
 C. Community Participation 
The primary motivation for the involvement of the World Bank in the 
Chad–Cameroon pipeline project was the alleviation of poverty or promo-
tion of socio-economic development.168 The achievement of this objective 
is not ineluctably intertwined with concentration of the wealth in the gov-
ernment and subsequent distribution to the population through public 
spending. Economic development may even arrive faster through a system 
of more direct distribution of mineral revenues to the population.169 Wealth 
in the hands of the people could spur commercial ventures that create jobs 
and facilitate the emergence of a veritable and vibrant middle class. It will 
also replace displaced local sources of livelihood such as farming, which in 
the case of Chad and other oil-producing countries, become casualties of 
petroleum production.170 
This intermediate version of shared sovereignty should therefore in-
clude a level of “local sovereignty” that involves equity participation of 
host communities in energy infrastructure projects. Thus, communities, 
through appropriate investment vehicles, should become partners in joint 
ventures that are currently the exclusive preserve of governments and ener-
 
 166  Id. 
 167  See Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance 
Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325, 326 (2011) (stating that private insur-
ance contracts can employ a system that rewards insured firms with premium discounts if they undertake 
risk-reducing activities). 
 168  Duruigbo, World Bank, supra note 33, at 39–40. 
 169  See Leibold, supra note 89, at 198 n.281 (“[I]f oil revenue went directly to the people of Chad, it 
could transform Chad’s economy to a ‘non-oil economy’ (one in which the government is accountable 
directly to the people) and in this way offset the inertia of the resource curse.”). 
 170  Id.; see also Karol Boudreaux, From Curse to Cure, TCS DAILY (Oct. 19, 2004, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.ideasinactiontv.com/tcs_daily/2004/10/from-curse-to-cure.html (reasoning that oil revenue 
dividends distributed to Nigerian citizens “could provide an engine for human development and for en-
trepreneurial activity in Nigeria”). 
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gy companies.171 Local equity participation could be accomplished through 
the adaptation of a model used in Texas that has proven effective for almost 
a century. Under the Texas Relinquishment Act, the government shares 
control of oil and gas with the owner of the land overlying the resources.172 
This model enables the landowner to share in the benefits of the resources 
located on his land instead of being displaced and given a paltry, often one-
time, compensation package.173 The expectation is that this approach will 
obviate disruptive conflicts with landowners, weaken corruptive and corro-
sive government control, and unleash economic engines through capital 
formation. 
Local equity participation will also help to ameliorate the obsolescing 
bargain problem discussed above. Recall that the obsolescing bargain oc-
curs because “once the [drilling or mining infrastructure] investment is in 
place, the advantage shifts through time from the investment supplier and 
the petroleum companies, to the investment recipient and host countries.”174 
This would empower local players, which could prove to be a useful anti-
dote to the undue influence of the host national governments. First, if the 
percentage accruable to the government is shared with host communities, 
the government would be defending a smaller pie and thus would be con-
strained to weigh its options before embarking on a major battle with the 
investors. Second, because other players—in this case, communities—have 
a direct stake in the venture, the government’s unilateral actions to renego-
tiate the contracts as a way of expressing its leverage would pit it against 
local, and not just foreign, interests.175 Communities would be reluctant to 
give up gains once they start enjoying them.176 Third, if the distribution of 
 
 171  See Emeka Duruigbo, Community Equity Participation in African Petroleum Ventures: Path to 
Economic Growth?, 35 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 111 (2013) [hereinafter Duruigbo, Equity Participation] 
(discussing the traditional approach to energy joint ventures by corporations and governments and argu-
ing for a more inclusive approach that includes community-based companies). 
 172  For discussions developing the idea of the Texas Relinquishment Act model as a form of equity 
participation and its adaptation for adoption in developing countries see Emeka Duruigbo, Oil, Turmoil 
and a Texas Export for Energy Security, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 231 (2012) [hereinafter Duruigbo, 
Texas Export]; Emeka Duruigbo, Realizing the People’s Right to Natural Resources, 12 WHITEHEAD J. 
DIPL. & INT’L. REL. 111, 118–20 (2011). 
 173  Duruigbo, Texas Export, supra note 172, at 245–48. 
 174  Loïc Conan, The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline: An Overview of the Threats to its Success and the 
Means to Prevent its Failure, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 225 (2011). 
 175  See Humphrey Onyeukwu, Obsolescence Bargaining in Transit Pipelines: What Options Exist for 
Securing Resource Supply 10 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/humphrey_onyeukwu/2/ (noting that the investment recipient’s reaction usual-
ly takes the form of renegotiated contracts, higher taxes, expropriation, or seizure of the income stream 
of the investment-supplying firm). 
 176  Critics deploy similar arguments against other social programs such as Social Security, Medicare, 
and the Affordable Care Act, claiming that once people start receiving benefits they are unlikely to per-
mit any real changes to programs.. See Cynthia Tucker, Conservatives Oppose Obamacare Because It 
May Succeed, YAHOO NEWS (Sept. 28, 2013, 1:00 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/conservatives-oppose-
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gains to communities takes place for a few years before the government 
seeks to revise the contract, the communities would arguably be in a strong-
er financial position to challenge the national government and ensure that 
terms favorable to them remain in place.177 It is also likely that communities 
would secure more favorable terms against the government when foreign 
intermediaries like oil companies are in charge of distributing contract rev-
enue,178 so communities would probably feel more secure with an initial 
contract that involves those intermediaries instead of a contract that is con-
cluded after the intermediaries are kicking them out.179 
Africa’s singular success story in escaping the resource curse is Bot-
swana.180 Through judicious and accountable management of public re-
sources and wise investment in education and healthcare, “Botswana has 
seen infant mortality drop, its people grow healthier, better educated, living 
longer, and the number of poor falling.”181 Botswana’s economic and politi-
 
obamacare-because-may-succeed-050013503.html (stating that political opponents of President 
Obama’s healthcare law are driven by the concern that if the law succeeds the beneficiaries would like 
and depend on it, making repeal difficult if not infeasible, and thus garnering political advantage to Mr. 
Obama’s party for generations to come); Kevin Drum, Republicans Nearing a Dead End on Obamacare, 
MOTHER JONES (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/12/republicans-nearing-
dead-end-obamacare (“It’s funny that Republicans don’t believe their own propaganda. For years, 
they’ve been hellbent on repealing Obamacare because they knew that once it was fully implemented in 
2014, it would have millions of beneficiaries who would fight to keep it. Once the benefits of a new 
program start flowing, it’s very, very hard to turn them off.”). 
 177  Of course, there is the possibility that community members would misuse the money they re-
ceived from the project, but it is hard to argue that they would be better off without any money, which is 
likely to be the case without equity participation or direct revenue distribution. See Duruigbo, Perma-
nent Sovereignty, supra note 30, at 77 (discussing the negative experience of a community in Alberta, 
Canada with distribution of resource revenues to community members). 
 178  See WORLD BANK ASSESSMENT, supra note 131, at 43 (“If [oil were developed without World 
Bank involvement], the environmental and social provisions and the external monitoring arrangements 
would not have been as thorough as those under the program. Also, it is probable that the revenue allo-
cations to the “priority sectors’ would have been lower, and virtually certain that the support institutions 
such as the Collège and the advisory group would not have been put in place.”). 
 179  See Macartan Humphreys, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the 
Mechanisms, 49 J. CONF. RES. 508, 512 & n.13 (2005) (discussing skepticism of local chiefs in the Do-
ba oil-producing region of Chad about oil revenues being actually spent in their region despite formal 
provisions to that effect in the revenue management plan and their resulting petition to oil corporations 
for direct compensation). 
 180  Paul Collier, Laws and Codes for the Resource Curse, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 9, 11–12 
(2008) (reasoning that Botswana’s rapid growth since the discovery of diamonds presents a counter ex-
ample that punctures a hole into any argument about the inevitability of the resource curse); cf. Amelia 
Cook & Jeremy Sarkin, Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Human 
Rights Versus Economic Development, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 453, 455 (2010) 
(“Achievements such as Botswana’s noteworthy economic growth, political stability, and regular elec-
tions often eclipse issues like human rights, which remain on the periphery of most analyses of Botswa-
na.”). 
 181  Keith Bryer, Africa Should Heed Botswana’s Simple Success Recipe, IOL (July 24, 2014, 8:00 
AM), http://www.iol.co.za/business/features/africa-should-heed-botswana-s-simple-success-recipe-
1.1724670. 
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cal successes owe in part to the existence of strong local institutions that are 
important components of the governing apparatus.182 These local institu-
tions facilitated participation of the people in decision-making and served 
as a constraint on the political leaders during the pre-colonial period.183 
Through the local assembly, or “kgotla,” commoners were able to proffer 
suggestions and criticize chiefs.184 In many other African countries, similar 
institutions were destroyed or enfeebled by the colonial administrators.185 A 
shared sovereignty arrangement should incorporate the development of 
strong local institutions through which the citizens in host communities par-
ticipate in the economic and political life of the country. While this may be 
accomplished through existing traditional institutions such as local chiefs, 
there should be no hesitation in jettisoning them in favor of brand new insti-
tutions if the existing ones are enmeshed in corruption and incompetence.186 
These community institutions, in the form of community-based corpora-
tions and local trust funds, could be the vehicle for implementing the equity 
participation component of the intermediate option.187 
While the advantages of the intermediate option are evident, there is 
also some room for concern. The following Part addresses potential objec-
tions to the proposal. 
 VI. RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OR 
OBJECTIONS 
The intermediate version of shared sovereignty provides an opportuni-
ty for national governments and international institutions to play more suit-
 
 182  Nancy Birdsall & Arvind Subramanian, Saving Iraq From Its Oil, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 
2004, at 83. For a discussion of other factors that explain Botswana’s exceptional performance see 
JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002), discussing the interaction of a wise 
political leadership and assistance from experts from international institutions such as the World Bank 
and the Ford Foundation; Andrés Marroquín Gramajo, Where Did the Miracle Come From? Exploring 
Institutional Formation in Botswana, 17 BOTS. J. AFR. STUD. 45 (2006), exploring the role of foreign 
aid, foreign human capital, ethnic homogeneity, relatively small population, and effective enforcement 
of government’s development plans; and Yoshio Wada & Ken Togo, Development Assistance and Eco-
nomic Growth: A Case Study of Botswana, MUSASHI UNIVERSITY (Feb. 28, 2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099080, (discussing the effectiveness of develop-
ment assistance. 
 183  Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, An African Success Story: Botswana, in IN 
SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTICAL NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 80 (Dani Rodrik ed., 
2003). 
 184  Scott Beaulier & J. Robert Subrick, The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Bot-
swana, 17 CONST. POL. ECON. 103 (2006). 
 185  Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 182, at 83. 
 186  See GARRY LEECH, CRUDE INTERVENTIONS: THE UNITED STATES, OIL AND THE NEW WORLD 
(DIS)ORDER 102 (2006) (discussing local corruption among the traditional chiefs and corporate repre-
sentatives in Nigeria). 
 187  For further exploration of this idea, see Duruigbo, Equity Participation, supra note 171. 
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able roles in achieving national development. It also fashions a more robust 
role for corporate actors and promotes local participation by community 
representatives. With this form of synergy, success seems more realistic. 
Nevertheless, the intermediate option is not a silver bullet. 
One major drawback of the intermediate proposal is that it does not 
completely escape some of the problems with other versions. In particular, 
one should not be overly optimistic of the possibility of its adoption by the 
countries that need it. Sovereignty is a concept jealously guarded by politi-
cal leaders who will not want to give up even a modicum of their sovereign-
ty without a bruising battle. While this concern has merit, it is too early to 
give up. Fortuitous circumstances may cause countries to adopt ideas, poli-
cies, and programs deemed unthinkable even a little while before.188 It is 
not outside the realm of possibility that in some countries ambitious politi-
cians who can incorporate shared sovereignty contracts into their political 
platforms will emerge. They may be able to secure the support of those vot-
ers who, tired of the status quo, are looking for improved governance that 
can arise from the cooperation of domestic officials and international ac-
tors.189 
Corporate immersion may also elicit some objection from corporations 
and critics who believe that public and private functions should be kept 
separate.190 These critics argue that traditional obligations of government 
should not be transferred to business entities that are better suited to deliv-
ering value for their shareholders.191 Efforts by corporations to assist with 
development projects may draw the ire of the government, especially if it 
highlights the government’s incompetence and corruption in executing its 
own projects. The resulting schism could jeopardize the entire shared sov-
ereignty arrangement, leaving all parties worse off. Nevertheless, the issue 
can be delicately handled in a way that does not ruffle feathers unnecessari-
ly while delivering progress to host communities.192 
 
 188  See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER (1991) (discuss-
ing how oil-producing states in the United States accepted far-reaching reforms that they would have 
rejected outright a little while earlier, but instead softened their opposition because of existential threats 
faced by the petroleum industry in the absence of tough federal regulation). 
 189  See, e.g., Leibold, supra note 89, at 199 (reporting on interviews with some Chadian citizens who 
favor involvement of external institutions such as the World Bank to improve domestic governance); see 
also Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 39. 
 190  See generally J. Nna Emeka ‘Wokoro, Beyond Petroleum Production to Community Develop-
ment: International Oil Companies as Proxy Governments, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 323 (2010). 
 191  See id. at 344 (“While companies operating in harsh regions, such as the Niger Delta region, have 
little practical option when faced with immense domestic and international pressures besides performing 
quasi-government roles in developing local communities, the reality is that such a role perpetuates cor-
ruption, apathy, and neglect. The cure is worse than the disease.”). 
 192  See Smis & Kingah, supra note 122, at 42 (“MNCs lose nothing when they adopt positive and 
forward looking-pro-poor strategies in the countries where they conduct business. Hitherto, they have 
been regarded as being aloof and too distant from the population. In terms of concerns over non-
interference this option is sensible. However, MNCs can engage directly in social initiatives with poor 
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Another objection is that corporate participation is sometimes saddled 
with corruption. Some corporate officers engage in corrupt practices that 
undermine the execution of their projects.193 This problem has arisen in 
World Bank-funded infrastructure projects.194 The Chinese investment ap-
proach recommended herein is also not immune from corrupt activities.195 
Corporate corruption can be tackled effectively through an all-hands-on-
deck approach that involves the World Bank, home countries of multina-
tional corporations (MNCs), host countries, and watchful NGOs.196 For in-
stance, transparency initiatives, while not a complete panacea, should be 
vigorously supported to ensure that those responsible for managing oil rev-
enues do not hide under opacity to mismanage the funds or defraud the 
people.197 Channeling resources toward citizen education or public enlight-
enment campaigns that mobilize the people to hold their political leaders 
accountable can further strengthen transparency measures.198 
Local equity participation may also be constrained by the fact that 
community-based corporations lack the financial resources to hold an own-
ership stake in joint petroleum ventures.199 Their financial predicament is 
exacerbated by the fact that the oil and gas industry is highly capital-
intensive. Appropriate arrangements could be worked out in which other 
partners could “carry” the community corporations at the early stage, re-
covering their investment with “penalties” or interest when the projects start 
 
communities where they do business. Rather than use government intermediaries, it will be better for 
them to craft their programs directly for the benefit of the local communities that host them.”). 
 193  See Emeka Duruigbo, Managing Oil Revenues for Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria: The 
Case for Community-Based Trust Funds, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 121, 162 (2004); Leech, su-
pra note 186, at 102 (“In March 2005, Chris Finlayson, Shell’s chief executive for exploration and pro-
duction in Africa, acknowledged that the company had experienced significant corruption among its 
employees with regard to funding local community projects.” (citation omitted)). 
 194  See generally Courtney Hostetler, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption 
on World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 231 (2011). 
 195  See Pádraig Carmody, The Scramble for Biofuels and Timber in Africa, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIP. & 
INT’L REL. 125, 131 (2011) (discussing cases in Congo-Brazzaville, where the country’s minister of 
forestry and environment is a major shareholder in a Chinese timber company operating there, and the 
construction of a large house by the Chinese for a senior government official that manages large infra-
structure projects in the country). 
 196  See Hostetler, supra note 194, at 259–70; Mujih, supra note 156 (discussing the role of NGOs in 
influencing project outcomes, especially when legal regimes are lacking). 
 197  See, e.g., Gavin Hilson & Roy Maconachie, “Good Governance” and Extractive Industries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 MIN. PROC. & EXTRACTIVE METALLURGY REV. 52 (2009); Gavin Hilson & Roy 
Maconachie, The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Panacea or White Elephant for Sub-
Saharan Africa?, in MINING, SOCIETY AND A SUSTAINABLE WORLD 469 (J.P. Richards ed., 2009) (cri-
tiquing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). 
 198  See Alex Kardon et al., Extractive Accountability: Implications of the Resource Curse for CSR 
Theory and Practicei, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 59, 63 (2008). 
 199  See Emeka Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria’s Emergence as Major Gas 
Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty?, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 448–49 (2009). 
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producing or become profitable.200 The concept of carrying is well-known 
and utilized in the oil and gas industry, with some situations (but not all) al-
lowing the party advancing the money to collect a penalty or interest to ac-
count for the time value of money.201 One context in which interest is car-
ried is a co-tenancy.202 Where co-tenants own mineral rights, some of the 
owners may choose not to sign a lease with the oil and gas company inter-
ested in developing the minerals. If the company obtains a lease from any 
of the co-tenants, it may proceed with the development in some jurisdic-
tions such as Texas.203 In that event, the company will shoulder the costs of 
operations but will be able to recover all the costs (without charging inter-
est) before sharing any available profits with the nonleasing co-tenants.204 
Carrying is also practiced in international oil transactions where the oil 
company signs a production sharing contract with the national government. 
The operating company bears all the costs of exploration and production. If 
a commercial discovery is made, the company recovers its costs and shares 
subsequent production with the government on an agreed formula.205 
The Community Risk Insurance Program would also confront chal-
lenges. First, the environmental insurance sub-market is not a very attrac-
tive one for insurers.206 There are a number of reasons why insurers are re-
luctant to insure against pollution.207 For example, factual disputes, 
engendered by the fact that some environmental injuries have a long latency 
period,208 can lead to uncertainties about the policy years responsible for 
 
 200  Id.; see also JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 30, 50 (5th ed., 2009). 
 201  See OWEN ANDERSON ET AL., HEMINWAY OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 480 (4th ed., 
2004). 
 202  JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 436 (6th ed., 2013) (dis-
cussing the process of “carrying” in the context of a non-leasing co-tenant). 
 203  See generally PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, OIL AND GAS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 120–39 (9th ed., 2011). 
 204  Id. 
 205  ZHIGUO GAO, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT TRENDS AND NEW 
DIRECTIONS 72 (1994) (defining a production sharing contract as “an agreement under which a foreign 
company, serving as a contractor to the host country/its national oil company, recovers its costs each 
year from production and is further entitled to receive a certain share of the remaining production as 
payment in kind for the exploration risks assumed and the development service performed if there is a 
commercial discovery”). 
 206  Abraham, supra note 160, at 1770–71 (“Despite the demand for insurance coverage of pollution 
liability, however, such insurance is not generally offered. . In short, there is a mismatch between the 
losses resulting from oil spills, the insurance available to the victims of spills, the liability of the parties 
responsible for losses caused by spills, and the insurance available to the parties who face such liabil-
ity.”). 
 207  See id., at 1784–86; Elli Sperdokli, Marine Insurance for Oil Pollution, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 611, 619–20 (2014) (discussing the constraints to obtaining environmental insurance cover-
age to protect against liability from other actors’ activities). 
 208  See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 160, at 1771 n.5 (“There also may be long-latency diseases result-
ing from exposure to oil or chemical dispersants that do not manifest themselves for considerable peri-
ods after exposure . .”). 
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coverage.209 Furthermore, there are the enormous costs of cleaning up pol-
lution and remediating the affected areas.210 There are also legal obstacles 
to eliminating the moral hazard that would accompany insuring against 
gradually occurring pollution as opposed to sudden and accidental pollu-
tion.211 In the case of gradually occurring pollution, the insured companies 
can take steps to detect the pollution almost at inception and be in a position 
to mitigate the damage once they detect the pollution.212 With insurance, 
however, they would likely abandon this responsibility.213 Accordingly, to 
avoid the moral hazard, insurance companies were willing to insure only 
sudden and accidental pollution, but judicial interpretation stymied this ef-
fort.214 
Thus, even if such a program were adopted, oil companies may not 
have adequate options for the purchase of the insurance.215 The international 
community could address this problem through the creation of an institution 
structured like MIGA. This institution would do for communities what 
MIGA does for companies. In a nutshell, it would protect communities 
from investment risks in the same way that MIGA protects businesses from 
political risks that could adversely affect their investment, thereby dissuad-
ing them from proceeding with the investment opportunity.216 
CRIP could also create moral hazards as communities exploit the ex-
istence of insurance to their advantage. Communities are constantly accused 
of vandalizing oil pipelines and other infrastructure to capture their share of 
the oil rents or to send a message to oil corporations and governments about 
their grievances.217 While some of the accusations are not accurately at-
tributed, because those making the charges have a motive for leveling them, 
many of the allegations have considerable merit.218 A continuation or esca-
 
 209  Id. at 1785–86. 
 210  Id. at 1786. 
 211  Id. at 1784–85. 
 212  Id. at 1784. 
 213  Id. 
 214  Id. at 1784–85. 
 215  For a more optimistic view of the capacity of the market to make environmental insurance avail-
able, particularly if there is a mandate for operators to carry insurance, see generally David A. Dana & 
Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insur-
ance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523 (2014). 
 216  For a useful definition of risk, and identification of several commercial and non-commercial 
risks, see Juan Camilo Hoyos, The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Mitigating Project Finance’s 
Risks: The Case of Colombia, 40 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 285, 288–89 (2013), and Paul E. 
Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 1, 4 (1994). 
 217  Ibaba Samuel Ibaba & John C. Olumati, Sabotage Induced Oil Spillages and Human Rights Vio-
lation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 11 J. SUST. DEV. AFR. 51 (2009); Weaver, supra note 45, at 556. 
 218  For instance, oil operators in Nigeria are eager to make those allegations because those incidents 
are classified as sabotage, which provides a complete basis for escaping liability in claims against the 
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lation of such incidents is never too far off. Similarly, corporations may be 
tempted to shift all responsibility to the insurance companies and not take 
appropriate steps to conduct their operations as properly as they would be if 
they were fully financially and legally accountable for any misconduct.219 
This kind of problem has been identified in the context of “Director and Of-
ficer” insurance maintained by companies to protect officers in the event of 
claims against them for wrongfully discharging their duties.220 Insurance 
companies may reduce the moral hazard of corporate apathy by ensuring 
that the oil companies have sufficient skin in the game, using known un-
derwriting tools such as high deductibles and significant levels of co-
insurance.221 Besides, oil companies are also conversant with the fact that 
they would continue to suffer reputational damage and other costs, includ-
ing increased premiums and even outright exclusions, if they continue to 
conduct their operations below acceptable standards.222 
 VII. CONCLUSION 
Africa is gradually moving from the position of an avid spectator to 
 
operators for negligence and the resulting damage to individual and communal property. See O. 
ADEWALE, NIG. INST. OF ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES, SABOTAGE IN THE NIGERIAN PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY: SOME SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 14–19 (1990). 
 219  A similar objection has been raised in the context of a corruption risk insurance proposal under 
MIGA. See Okaru-Bisant, supra note 152, at 291 (stating that “opponents of the corruption risk insur-
ance propose a weak argument that providing corruption risk insurance coverage to private investors 
will encourage the vice and sanction bad behavior” (citation omitted)). 
 220  See TOM BAKER AND SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY 
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010). 
 221  See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 162, at 1420 (“Insurers use contract design to mitigate moral 
hazard in several ways. They use contract provisions like limits, deductibles, and coinsurance so that the 
insurance does not fully insulate people from their losses, keeping their skin in the game. Limits keep 
insureds’ skin in the game at the high end, deductibles at the low end, and coinsurance throughout.” (ci-
tation omitted)). 
 222  If premiums vary with risk, the theory goes, then policyholders should reduce risk to obtain 
lower premiums. Insurers should also check episodically to make sure their policyholders are 
doing what they can to reduce risk. These checks give insurers a chance to pressure policy-
holders to behave well and also provide early information that something is amiss. Policies 
should be structured so that policyholders are unable to recoup all their losses. Policyholders 
need to have some skin in the game so that they will always have a reason to be careful. Of 
course, insurance only covers monetary losses, so policyholders will always have some stake 
in the outcome (reputation, goodwill, time, and trouble), but insurers usually insist that they 
also share monetary losses through deductibles. 
Carol A. Heimer, Failed Governance: A Comment on Baker and Griffith’s Ensuring Corporate Miscon-
duct, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 480, 485 (2013); see also Okaru-Bisant, supra note 152, at 291 (arguing 
that irresponsible companies would be screened out of the insurance protection); Baker & Swedloff, 
supra note 162, at 1417–23 (examining the moral hazard of policy holders not internalizing the external-
ities and identifying tools for addressing it). 
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that of key player in international legal development.223 One area of visible 
progress is in the extension of the doctrine of shared sovereignty to natural 
resource exploitation through the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project. The 
Chad experiment may have failed, but the model need not be completely 
discarded. The application of the shared sovereignty norm in petroleum ex-
ploitation for the socio-economic benefit of the population and political de-
velopment of the country is still a possibility. Success in these undertakings 
will require greater commitment from the World Bank and other interna-
tional organizations, the humility of political leaders, sacrifice on behalf of 
multinational corporations, the dedication of citizens, and the vigilance of 
civil society. Indeed, Africa can continue to lead the way in further devel-
opment of the norm of shared sovereignty over natural resources. Instead of 
the weak form of shared sovereignty that was implemented in Chad, or the 
strong version advocated by some scholars that has little chance of ac-
ceptance by national governments, interested parties should introduce an 
intermediate form of shared sovereignty. The intermediate form, as outlined 
in this article, has three core components: greater commitments by sover-
eigns and international actors, deeper involvement of multinational corpora-
tions in development policy, and a clear space for community participation. 
The lesson so far is not “nunc dimittis” (departure time), but one of laying a 
foundation that may serve as the chief cornerstone in the quest for symbi-
otic foreign investment and energy development. 
 
 223  For more on this point, see AFRICA: MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, su-
pra note 1. 
